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TAX TREATMENT OF AN ATTORNEY'S RECEIPT OF
OVERRIDING ROYALTY INTERESTS As
COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES
INTRODUCTION
An oil and gas property is a subsurface mineral estate.' The
process of converting the subsurface estate into minerals requires
exploration to determine if the mineral exists under the surface,
acquisition of a lease to convert the mineral estate, development to
drill for and measure the quantity of minerals, production to ex-
tract the minerals from the subsurface and marketing of the min-
erals produced. This estate may be conveyed separately from the
surface or land estate.2
The formation of a venture to develop mineral deposits usu-
ally requires the services of an attorney to examine titles and draft
lease agreements. The attorney's role in the examination of titles
and drafting of leases for the venture may be compensated by the
creation of an overriding royalty interest in lieu of payment in
cash. Compensation in the form of an overriding royalty interest
creates the possibility of substantial return for his services if the
venture produces oil in paying quantities. This comment focuses
on the taxation of an attorney's receipt of an overriding royalty
interest in the mineral estate in exchange for his services.
REVENUE RULING 83-46
The Internal Revenue Service recently published a ruling on
the taxation of service providers in an oil and gas venture who
acquire overriding royalty interests. Revenue Ruling 83-461 ana-
lyzed three typical fact situations in the use of services in oil and
gas development. A corporation, an employee, and an attorney
each received an overriding royalty interest for services provided
in connection with the acquisition and development of oil and gas
leases. The corporation syndicated partnerships that acquired in-
terests in oil and gas properties. The employee was administering
the financial arrangements and was overseeing the operations for
1. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 202 (abr. ed. 1981).
2. id.
3. Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983-1 C.B. 17.
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the acquisition and development of oil and gas properties. In con-
nection with their performance of these services, each party re-
ceived an overriding royalty interest. An overriding royalty inter-
est was defined as follows:
[An economic interest in oil and gas in place, created from the
working interest that entitles its owner to a specified fraction of
gross production, free of operating and development costs. The term
of an overriding royalty interest is coextensive with the term of the
working interest from which it was created. Thus, the transfer of an
overriding royalty is an assignment of a property interest and is not
an anticipatory assignment of income."
Rev. Rul. 83-46 analyzes the tax consequences of receiving
an overriding royalty interest in an oil and gas venture by apply-
ing § 83(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.5 However, after
describing § 83(a) and citing Rev. Rul. 67-118, for the definition
of an overriding royalty interest, the opinion concludes that a
transfer of a property interest has occurred and each of the three
persons received a property interest in the form of overriding roy-
alties in connection with the acquisition and development of oil
and gas leases. Therefore, the fair market value of each overriding
royalty interest must be included in gross income under § 83 in
the year of receipt of the interest.
Until Rev. Rul. 83-46, the tax consequences of an attorney's
receipt of an overriding royalty interest for services performed in
connection with the acquisition and development of oil and gas
leases have followed from the principle of income realization. Eis-
ner v. Macomber6 provides the classic definition of income realiza-
tion. In that case, a stockholder of a corporation received a 50%
stock dividend and did not report it as income. The Service main-
tained that this was a gain accruing to the stockholder's invest-
ment, and income realization was a function of value in the hands
of the taxpayer. The Court rejected this theory and held:
Here we have the essential matter: not a gain accruing to capital,
not a growth or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a
profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding from the prop-
erty, severed from the capital, however invested or employed, and
coming in, being 'derived,' that is, received or drawn by the recipient
4. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 67-118, 1967 C.B. 427).
5. I.R.C. § 83(a) (1976).
6. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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(the taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal; that is in-
come derived from property.
7
The controlling fact in the determination that the stockholder
had no income was that the stockholder had received nothing out
of the company's assets for his separate use and benefit.8 This doc-
trine has been modified by subsequent decisions included in which
is the assignment of income doctrine. 9 Under the assignment of
income doctrine, the power to dispose of income is indicative of
ownership right; therefore, income is realized to the owner.
To understand the holding of Rev. Rul. 83-46, it is necessary
to focus upon the nature of the overriding royalty interest con-
veyed to a service provider prior to production of the minerals and
consider whether the Service has correctly characterized it as a
property interest. Rev. Rul. 83-46 profoundly changes the tax
treatment of overriding royalty interests received in compensation
for services in mineral acquisition and development. But the ruling
failed to discuss its implications for tax treatment of overriding
royalty interests received in compensation for services under the
pool of capital doctrine.
THE POOL OF CAPITAL DOCTRINE
The fee simple owner of real property owns the right to use
and enjoy the surface and the subsurface of the property. 10 "The
landowner alone [is] entitled to prospect for, sever and remove
from the land anything found on or beneath the surface."" Inter-
ests in the minerals, which may be granted, take the form of
leasehold interests, mineral interests and royalty interests."
A leasehold interest 3 conveys the exclusive right of the own-
er's interest to enter the land and to prospect for and to remove
the minerals from the land. The lease is for a term of years and
for as long as economic production of the minerals continues. For
signing the lease the landowner usually receives a cash considera-
tion (called a bonus), a royalty interest, and a share of the prod-
uct of the land or proceeds from its sale.
7. Id. at 207.
8. Id. at 212.
9. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
10. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note i, § 202.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. § 202.1.
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A mineral interest 14 conveys the right to enter the land and to
prospect for and to remove minerals. It differs from a leasehold in
two ways: 1) it may be in fee, in fee simple defeasible, for life, or
for a term of years and 2) it conveys the right to drill and the
right to execute leases.
A royalty interest,1 5 although created in the same manner as
a mineral interest, does not convey the right to enter and prospect
the land. The royalty interest is an interest in the production, a
"share in such minerals as are severed, or the proceeds thereof."1 6
The royalty interest may be an incident of a lease, such as the
reservation of one-eighth (which gives the landowner one of every
eight barrels of oil taken from the ground or the proceeds
thereof). The landowner may sever and convey a royalty interest
prior to leasing, subject only to the durational limitation of the
landowner's interest in the land. An overriding royalty interest
may also be severed and conveyed by a lessee, but this grant is
limited in duration to the terms of the lease.
Mineral ownership, whether of minerals in place1 or of the
right to remove them from the land, 18 is subject to the law of cap-
ture. The owner of mineral rights on a tract of land acquires title
to all oil and gas when produced, though part of that oil may have
migrated from under the land of adjoining land owners. 9 The pro-
ducing owner has no liability for draining the other owner's
land.2
0
Taxation of interests created by oil and gas leases recognizes
that a lease grants the exclusive possession of mineral deposits and
the right to remove and reduce the minerals to ownership, thereby
creating a substantial property interest. 21 The lease passes to the
lessee the privilege of producing oil and gas for a defined period.
These operations resemble a manufacturing business using the soil
and are not a sale of the land or its mineral content. 2 State law
14. Id. § 202.2.
15. Id. § 202.3.
16. id.
17. Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717 (1915).
18. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, § 203.1.
19. Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558 (1948).
20. However, state regulatory authorities have been established in the oil producing
states to regulate production among various properties and ownership interests within
producing fields. The regulatory schemes provide for pooling and unitization so that actual
production of oil and gas may be limited to one parcel, but the proceeds are divided among
all landowners. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 53-3-7 (1972) and MISS. CODE ANN. § 53-3-103
(Supp. 1983).
21. Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364 (1925).
22. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106-08 (1932).
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controls the taxation of property interests only when the federal
taxing statute expressly makes its operation dependent upon state
law. 23 The conveyance of a lease to a lessee is not a taxable event
unless a bonus is paid to the lessor and the bonus is treated as
ordinary income."
One often litigated issue of oil and gas taxation, depletion al-
lowance,25 has required the courts to examine income realization
in conveyances of interests in minerals. A landmark case, Palmer
v. Bender,28 involved a lessee who subsequently conveyed to drill-
ing companies his interest in a lease in exchange for a bonus pay-
ment and one-eighth royalty interest. The Court held that the
characterization of the conveyance by the lessee to the operating
company under Louisiana law was a sublease, but this was not
controlling on the question of how the depletion allowance should
be apportioned. As lessees, they each had an economic interest. 7
"[T]he oil in the ground was a reservoir of capital investment of
the several parties [and all] were entitled to share in the oil pro-
duced."' 28 Depletion was therefore allocated by the respective in-
terests of the parties. Therefore, the lessee acquired legal control
of a valuable economic interest capable of realization as gross in-
come by the exercise of his rights under the lease.
The Palmer v. Bender conception of an oil and gas venture as
a sharing of income realized at the time of production of the min-
erals became known as the pool-of-capital doctrine. The IRS
adopted the rule in the publication of General Counsel Memoran-
dum 2273029 in 1941. This landmark ruling contains "the very
fundament of the institutional arrangements . ..for exploration,
drilling, development and operation of oil and gas properties.
'30
Exchanges of cash, property or services for an economic interest in
the venture are nontaxable events under the pool-of-capital doc-
trine. Contributors acquire economic interests when they contrib-
ute to the pool-of-capital. But the transferor of the economic in-
terest gives the contributors a right to share production and does
23. Id. at 109-10.
24. id.
25. The depletion allowance is "a deduction in computing taxable income . ..for
depletion" of mineral deposits "[i]n the case of mines, oil and gas wells, other natural
deposits, and timber ...." I.R.C. § 611(a) (1984).
26. 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
27. Id. at 555.
28. Id. at 558.
29. G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214.
30. Galvin, GCM 22730 - Twenty-five Years Later, 18 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. &
TAX'N 511 (1967).
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not exchange a property interest." The exchange of the right to
share production carries a corresponding shift of the exploration
and development costs and the value of the transferor's interest is
unchanged. Therefore, the test of tax consequences of a contribu-
tion of cash, property or services to an oil and gas venture is
whether the net effect of the transfer changes the value of the
transferor's interest.
32
An attorney, as a service provider, should receive a right to
share production from the override. The company granting the
overriding royalty interest shifts the cost of drafting the leases and
of examining titles to the attorney. As a transaction where the net
effect of the value of the transferor company's interest is zero, this
receipt of an overriding royalty interest is a sharing arrangement.
Applying the rule of the pool-of-capital doctrine, the attorney does
not realize income at the time of receipt of the interest but instead
he capitalizes his expenses and recovers them through depletion
and depreciation.33
To qualify under G.C.M. 22730 the attorney must receive the
interest in return for services rendered in connection with the ac-
quisition, exploration or development of the property.3" The inter-
est must be in the same oil and gas property for which the services
are performed. If the property interest is received in satisfaction
of any liability other than the engagement for the property, the
interest will not qualify. 5
In Rev. Rul. 77-176, 3 the Service implicitly applied the pool-
of-capital doctrine to an assignment to a driller of a working inter-
est in a portion of a lease. The driller also received a working
interest in other acreage under the same lease beyond the drill
site. The Service concluded that the conveyance of the interest in
other acreage beyond the drill site was taxable. "Upon assign-
ment, X received two separate economic interests in the tract or
parcel of land, each such interest being a separate Section 614
property . . . -.1 Because the acreage exclusive of the drill site is
a property separate from that to which the development contribu-
3 I. Barnett and Coffin, New Financing Techniques in the Oil and Gas Industry, 34
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 431, 461 (1983).
32. Id.
33. Contribution of Services for an Economic Interest in Mineral Properties [19741
FED. TAX OIL & GAS/NATURAL RESOURCES 1021-1021.1.
34. J. RAY JONES, OIL AND GAS FEDERAL INCOME TAX MANUAL 22 (11 th ed. 1982).
35. Id.
36. Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1971-1 C.B. 77.
37. Id.
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tion was made, it was outside the pool of capital.3 8 However, in
James A. Lewis Engineering, Inc. v. Commissioner,9 the Fifth
Circuit suggested in dictum that an attorney or other professional
contributing services to the sharing arrangement might not qualify
for the narrow class contemplated by the G.C.M.'
§ 83 TREATMENT OF THE RECEIPT OF A PROPERTY INTEREST
FOR SERVICES
Under § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code and its regulations,
gross income means "all income from whatever source derived," ''
including compensation for services in the form of property. Prop-
erty received by an attorney as compensation for services is taxa-
ble under § 61 unless he qualifies under the pool-of-capital
doctrine.
42
Under § 83(a) and its regulations, the gross income of a pro-
vider of services includes property transferred, in connection with
such services, to any person other than the person for whom such
services were performed. 3 The congressional committee reports
state that the purpose of § 83 is to foreclose the avoidance of tax
when stock in a corporation is given to an employee with restric-
tions placed upon it.44 However, the language used by the commit-
tee in its report neither limited the application of § 83 to stock nor
to a corporate transaction. The regulations say that the term
" 'property' includes real and personal property other than money
or an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money in the future
[and] also includes a beneficial interest in assets."45 The section is
applicable whether the services are for past, present or future ser-
vices and applies to employees and independent contractors.4 6 In-
dependent contractors are subject to the provisions of § 83."7 The
courts have applied it to stock, 4  and one court has applied it in
38. Id.
39. 339 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1964).
40. Id. at 709.
41. I.R.C. § 61 (1954); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(2) (1978); Commissioner v. Duber-
stein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
42. See Walls v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1932); Massey v. Commis-
sioner, 143 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1944).
43. I.R.C. § 83 (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a) et seq. (1978). See supra note 5.
44. H. R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1969).
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e) (1978).
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(f) (1978).
47. Alves v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 864 (1982); Sakol v. Commissioner, 574 F.2d
694 (2d Cir. 1978); Pledge v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1981).
48. Hensel Phelps Const. Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 939 (1980), afd. 703 F.2d
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dictum to taxation of the receipt of a partnership interest for ser-
vices. "9 Section 83 has withstood attack on grounds of unconstitu-
tionality as a violation of the fifth and sixteenth amendments.50
The issue of whether § 83 is applicable to property other than
stock has not been adequately addressed by the courts. The legis-
lative history of the section does not give a definitive answer. The
purpose of the statute was to close a tax avoidance opportunity,
which existed for employees to receive restrictive stock and defer
the tax until the time the restrictions lapsed.5 ' At that time only
the value of the stock when it was transferred to the employee was
treated as compensation unless the value of the stock had declined
and then the lower amount would be treated as the amount of
compensation. While the purpose of the statute was narrow in its
scope, the language in which the statute is framed is broad. The
statute does not speak in terms of stock or its equivalent but
rather speaks in terms of "property" and "rights in property."
There is no language in the statute which limits its application to
transfers of corporate property. Read in light of its purpose, the
statute should be limited to corporate transfers and compensation
to employees in the form of stock or other property given by the
corporation or its principal stockholders.5 2
The Service has taken the position in Rev. Rul. 83-46 that an
attorney retained by a corporation in connection with the corpora-
tion's acquisition of oil and gas properties is subject to § 83. The
Service reasoned that the attorney received a property interest in
connection with the rendering of services to the corporation and
that as an independent contractor the attorney's receipt of an
overriding royalty interest is a taxable event under § 83. This in-
terpretation comports with the view that § 83 is applicable to cor-
porate transfers but fails to comment upon whether a sharing ar-
rangement exists.
485 (10th Cir. 1983). In Armantrout v. Commissioner, 570 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978),
payments to employees' children for educational purposes were includable as compensation
earned by the employees, and the court noted that both § 61 and § 83 could be applied to
reach this result. The Internal Revenue Service has applied § 83 to the leasing of business
suits by a corporation to its executive employees. Rev. Rul. 80-322, 1980-2 C.B. 36.
49. Sakol v. Commissioner, 574 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1978).
50. Pasquale v. Cassetta, 48 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) D 79,384 (1979); Cohn v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 443 (1979).
51. Pledger v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 618 (1979), af'd. 641 F.2d 287 (5th Cir.
1981).
52. See Tilford v. Commissioner, 705 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1983).
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THE INHERENT CONFLICT
Section 83 is an income realization statute, enacted to recog-
nize income in restricted stock compensation plans53 and perhaps
in other property54 received in connection with services. By the
holding of Rev. Rul. 83-46, an attorney's receipt of an overriding
royalty interest constitutes the receipt of a property interest in
connection with services. When acquired in connection with ser-
vices rendered in the formation of a sharing arrangement, the
transaction arguably comes within the ambit of the pool-of-capital
doctrine.55 The pool-of-capital doctrine is a nonrecognition-of-in-
come doctrine5" applied to transactions in the natural resource
area. Nonrecognition-of-income avoids taxation of transactions
which would otherwise result in taxable income. Burton-Sutton
Oil Co. v. Commissioner58 allowed nonrecognition treatment in an
overriding royalty measured by net profits acquired by a drilling
service provider. This nonrecognition treatment was consistent
with Palmer v. Bender nonrecognition treatment. 59 In the case of
Manahan Oil Co."0 the rationale was that a service provider's re-
ceipt of an overriding royalty interest should receive nonrecogni-
tion treatment.
Nonrecognition under the pool-of-capital doctrine should ap-
ply to the attorney's receipt of an overriding royalty interest as
defined in Rev. Rul. 83-46. A sharing arrangement exists in the
creation of the oil and gas venture. When the overriding royalty
interest is received for services performed in the acquisition of
leases from which the override is conveyed, the attorney is con-
tributing services to the pool of capital. The attorney has acquired
an economic interest in exchange for his services.
If nonrecognition of income is allowed, the attorney or other
53. Tilford v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 134, 144 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 705
F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1983).
54. Armantrout v. Commissioner, 570 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978).
55. Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946). But see United
States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964).
56. Galvin, supra note 30, at 537.
57. See I.R.C. §§ 351, 721 (1984).
58. 328 U.S. 25 (1946).
59. Galvin, supra note 30, at 537.
60. 8 T.C. 1159 (1947). In Manahan, the service provider was a driller who acquired
a carried interest. A carried interest is one where the carrying party provides capital for
the venture and the carried party provides the services. When production occurs, the pro-
ceeds go first to repay this investment and then are divided by agreement between the
carried party and the carrying party. The carried party receives a percentage of net pro-
duction; the overriding royalty interest receives a percentage of gross production. H. WIL-
LIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, §§ 424, 424.1.
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service provider has avoided tax on the property interest. The at-
torney will defeat the purpose of § 83 because the attorney's ser-
vices have been compensated by a property interest. Value at-
taches to the interest under § 83 notwithstanding the nonexistence
of an income producing capacity in the property. Under § 83, the
property interest is taxed; under Palmer v. Bender, and the pool-
of-capital doctrine the property interest is not taxed unless an in-
come producing capability is realized or is transferred.
Section 83 measures tax liability by the value of the property
as compared with economic income."' To the extent that the non-
recognition principles of the pool-of-capital doctrine are derived
from Eisner v. Macomber, its measure of tax liability is the actual
gain derived from the transaction. For his contribution of services,
the attorney would capitalize the value of his property under § 83
but would capitalize only the cost of his services if he qualifies for
nonrecognition treatment under the pool-of-capital doctrine.
Section 83 requires a transfer of a property interest to any
person. The pool-of-capital doctrine contemplates a property inter-
est that is "acquired" by a person who "contributes" services to
the pool of capital. The Regulations" say that a § 83 transfer
occurs when a person acquires a beneficial ownership interest in
the property. The regulations seem to expand the "transfer" con-
cept to a breadth capable of encompassing the acquisition concept
of the pool-of-capital doctrine.
"Services" within the meaning of § 83 includes the recogni-
tion of the performance of or the refraining from performance of
services past, present and future.6 3 The services contemplated by
the pool-of-capital doctrine are those necessary to develop the
minerals. The recognition principles of § 83 and the pool-of-capi-
tal doctrine clearly conflict in applicability to the attorney's
services.
Within § 83 there exists a nonrecognition possibility. If the
property is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture" and is not
transferable,65 tax liability on the value of the property is deferred
until the property no longer is so restricted or the property be-
comes transferable. The substantial risk of forfeiture exists where
rights in the property are conditioned directly or indirectly upon
61. Gresham v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 322, 333 (1982) (Footherson, J., concurring).
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(1) (1978).
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(f) (1978).
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c) (1978).
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(d) (1978).
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future performances of substantial services by any person or the
occurrence of a condition related to the purpose of the transfer.
The future exercise of the right to drill may be a future perform-
ance of service or condition related to the transfer. The property
must also be transferable without the substantial risk of forfeiture.
The overriding royalty interest may receive nonrecognition treat-
ment, but the measurement of tax liability is deferred until the
substantial risk of forfeiture does not exist. If a producing well is
brought in, tax liability will arise with the potential of a high val-
uation. An option exists to be taxed on the property at the time of
receipt.6" If the lease terminates or is abandoned without produc-
tion, a tax loss will result for the property upon which the option
was exercised.
6 7
Judge Fay examined the essence of the inherent conflict be-
tween § 83 and the concept of income realization in his dissent in
Pledger v. Commissioner.6 8 The general rule for taxation of com-
pensation in the form of property is that tax should be assessed on
the fair market value of the property less any amount paid by the
taxpayer. When § 83 values property at an amount greater than
the difference between its real value and the amount paid, it vio-
lates the principles of Eisner v. Macomber. He used the example
of an attorney who agrees to draft a will for a painter in exchange
for a painting worth $200. If the painting has a hole and is worth
only $100 his tax should be $100. His point was that § 83 may tax
the unrestricted value of the painting, $200, and, force the tax-
payer to sell the painting and create a deductible loss to recognize
the economic value of the transaction. Section 83 may tax incre-
ments of value which accrue from the property but are not re-
ceived by the recipient.
The essence of Judge Fay's analysis was that § 83 must be
subject to the income realization principles of Eisner v. Ma-
comber. If § 83 is so tested it becomes subject to the Palmer v.
Bender principles of income recognition in oil and gas transac-
tions. To reach the opposite conclusion requires reasoning that §
83 has modified Eisner v. Macomber, a modification to allow tax-
ation of accrued capital. The legislative history of § 83 does not
allow such an expansive change in the principle of income
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2 (1978).
67. Id.
68. Pledger v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 287, 294-97 (5th Cir. 1981) (Fay, J.,
dissenting).
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realization.
Is AN OVERRIDING ROYALTY INTEREST A PROPERTY INTEREST?
Section 83 requires a transfer of a property interest. An over-
riding royalty interest is a form of non-operating interest severed
from the working interest by grant or reservation."e
An overriding royalty is, first and foremost, a royalty interest. In
other words, it is an interest in oil and gas produced at the surface,
free of the expenses of production. It is, as is the lessor's royalty, an
interest in land and hence is governed by statutes and common law
rules relating to such interests, e.g., venue of an action. Its classifica-
tion as realty or personalty in any particular jurisdiction corresponds
to that jurisdiction's classification of an ordinary royalty. Although
an interest in land, it is clearly nonpossessory, and hence the owner
is not entitled to possessory remedies, e.g., trespass .... The life of
an overriding royalty is limited by the duration of the lease or other
interest from which it was carved or reserved by grant or
reservation.
70
Termination of the leasehold or other interest out of which
the overriding royalty interest was carved or reserved will extin-
guish the overriding royalty but a transfer of working interest will
not destroy it.71 The owner of the operating interest does not have
a duty to the owner of the overriding royalty interest to keep the
lease alive and is not liable for damages for failure to do so, in the
absence of an express covenant. 72 There is no fiduciary relation-
ship between the owner of the operating interest and the owner of
the overriding royalty interest.
73
The overriding royalty interest should be distinguished from
an oil payment, which is a share of the oil produced from the
premises which does not share in the surface production costs and
which terminates upon the payment of a given volume of produc-
tion.7' A reserved oil payment is one retained by the grantor when
an interest in oil and gas is transferred. A carved out oil payment,
on the other hand, is an oil payment created by conveyance and is
to be paid out of an interest retained by the creator-grantor. 75 The
69. H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, § 417.
70. Id. §§ 418.1, 418.2.
71. Id.
72. Id. § 420.1.
73. Id. § 420.2.
74. Id. § 422.
75. Id.
[VOL. 4:73
TAX ON ROYALTY INTEREST
duty to pay an oil payment is not a personal obligation but arises
only from actual production. "The oil payment terminates when a
given volume of production has been paid over or when a specified
sum from the sale of such oil has been realized.""6
An overriding royalty interest may be compared with a net
profits interest and a carried interest. None of these interests is
responsible for operating costs and all may be used as compensa-
tion for services rendered. A net profits interest is distinguishable
from an overriding royalty interest in that the net profits interest
is payable only from net production after costs while the overrid-
ing royalty is paid from gross production. In a carrying interest,
the carrying party is usually repaid for costs first and then produc-
tion is divided between the carrying party and the carried party."
Revenue Ruling 67-118,7' which the Service cites as author-
ity for the tax treatment of an overriding royalty interest, dealt
with the gift by an owner of producing oil and gas leases of an
overriding royalty interest to a trust. The overriding royalty inter-
est was for a term of five years. Under the provisions of the trust,
the trustees could deal with the royalties as if they were absolute
owners. Upon termination of the trust, the overriding royalties
(which have an economic life exceeding the term of the trust) or
the proceeds of the sale of the royalties would revert to the gran-
tor. In order to avoid taxation on the reversionary interest the in-
come had to be irrevocably payable for a period of at least two
years to the beneficiary. An assignment of the right to future in-
come to the trust would have been taxable to the grantor. The
Service defined an overriding royalty interest as one created from
the working interest entitling the owner to a specific fraction of
gross production and which is coextensive with the term of the
working interest. In this ruling the assignment of the overriding
royalty interest was held to be an assignment of a property inter-
est and not an anticipatory assignment of income such as an in-oil
payment right carved out of a larger interest.
In Rev. Rul. 67-118 the Service correctly described an oil
payment as an assignment of income.7 9 This is true even though
the oil payment may be sold8" and treated by the parties and state
law as a property interest. The overriding royalty interest differs
76. id.
77. Id. § 424.
78. Rev. Rul. 67-118, 1967-1 C.B. 163.
79. Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958). Cf I.R.C. § 636.
80. Id.
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in its duration; that is, the overriding royalty interest exists for the
life of the lease while the oil payment is limited by the value or
amount of production necessary to satisfy the terms of the convey-
ance. An overriding royalty interest in a producing well receives a
specified fraction of gross production or the proceeds thereof free
of production costs.
While the overriding royalty interest in a producing well is
correctly held to be a property interest in Rev. Rul. 67-118, it
does not follow that an overriding royalty interest is "property" in
an undeveloped lease. After production the overriding royalty
owner has enforceable rights in the property because there is pro-
duction. Until production, there are no rights against the working
interest or in the minerals. The lessee has acquired the right to
explore and drill. But the royalty owner has only the right to a pro
rata share of any successful exercise of the lessee's right. Value of
the overriding royalty may exist in its potential for marketability.
But to say that the interest is property for tax purposes because it
may be sold begs the question. Obviously the-royalty interest may
become property if conveyed. The question is what is the economic
usefulness of the interest to one who acquires the interest in an
exchange. The interest is a nonpossessory, unenforceable possibil-
ity of sharing income with a working interest owner who is under
no duty to exercise his right to drill. Thus the overriding royalty
owner has contributed his services for a right to a share of the
"opportunity of converting a right to develop the possibility of
oil,"81 which becomes property for tax purposes only when devel-
opment of this opportunity into producing wells has created pre-
sent economic usefulness. 2 The property interest in a producing
well in Rev. Rul. 67-118 does not exist in the pre-production over-
riding royalty interest of Rev. Rul. 83-46 because the economic
interest is not entitled to a specific fraction of gross production
until production begins. The Rev. Rul. 83-46 overriding royalty
interest fails the Service's definition of a taxable property interest
in an overriding royalty interest.
If the overriding royalty interest of Rev. Rul. 83-46 is a prop-
erty interest, it follows that the transfer of a working interest of
the lease in a carried interest arrangement is a property interest
under § 83. This would effectively overrule Burton-Sutton Oil Co.
v. Commissioner. Even the conveyance of a lease may be subject
81. Estate of Wernert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750, 762 (5th Cir. 1961).
82. id.
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to § 83 treatment because a lease has been held to be a property
interest for tax purposes. In a lease transaction the lessor, usually
the landowner but often a lessee, will convey to a lessee who will
be providing the service of drilling the well. If the fair market
value of the lease is greater than the amount paid, the difference
may be taxable under § 83 if the property is acquired in connec-
tion with the performance of services.
CONCLUSION
An attorney receiving an overriding royalty interest in com-
pensation for examining the title and drafting leases should be af-
forded nonrecognition treatment if there is compliance with the
pool-of-capital doctrine. The pool-of-capital doctrine has served a
useful purpose in the development of vitally needed natural re-
sources. Today, enormous sums are expended to drill for and pro-
duce oil and gas. Considering the high cost of capital required to
make these ventures possible, the pool of capital continues to serve
the purpose of reducing capital costs by bringing in service provid-
ers. These service providers enter at their own risk. In this sense
the pool of capital is not a legal fiction but a practical economic
reality, much like a corporation or partnership.
The Internal Revenue Service has misapplied the concept of
property interest in Rev. Rul. 83-46. Failure to examine the im-
pact of the pool-of-capital doctrine on the attorney-service pro-
vider brings confusion to formation of sharing arrangements. The
holding suggests an unconstitutional violation of the principles of
income realization in Palmer v. Bender. The Service should reex-
amine its holding by application of the pool-of-capital doctrine. A
less principled alternative would be to reformulate the doctrine in
light of § 83 value principles.
Stephen H. Leech, Jr.
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